Emory Law Journal
Volume 64

Issue 1

2014

Dismissing Derivative Actions in the Federal Courts for Failure to
Allege Demand Futility: Choosing a Standard of Appellate Review-Abuse of Discretion or De Novo?
Andrew S. Hirsch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Andrew S. Hirsch, Dismissing Derivative Actions in the Federal Courts for Failure to Allege Demand
Futility: Choosing a Standard of Appellate Review--Abuse of Discretion or De Novo?, 64 Emory L. J. 201
(2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol64/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

HIRSCH GALLEYSPROOFS2

9/18/2014 10:43 AM

DISMISSING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE DEMAND FUTILITY:
CHOOSING A STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW—
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR DE NOVO?
ABSTRACT
In the federal court system, when the district courts dismiss shareholders’
derivative actions for failure to allege demand futility, the circuit courts have
historically reviewed these dismissals for abuse of discretion. This started to
change when the Supreme Court of Delaware converted from deferential to
plenary review in 2000. Thereafter, many circuit courts expressed doubt about
their historical standard of review. Finally, the First Circuit converted to
de novo review in 2013, creating a definite circuit split and prompting the
Supreme Court to take up the issue. Unfortunately, the case fell from the
Court’s docket because the plaintiffs lost standing. Thus, the issue continues to
percolate in the circuit courts.
This Comment assembles all the information and analyses necessary for
the reader to fully understand the issue and concludes that the courts should
preserve the deferential standard. As an intermediate step to this conclusion,
this Comment argues that Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
itself—not Rule 12(b)(6) or any other rule—is the proper procedural vehicle
for dismissing a case when a plaintiff fails to allege demand futility—the
demand futility dismissal. This selection allows the courts to assign a standard
of review to the demand futility dismissal independent of any preexisting
standard, since the Rule 23.1 dismissal does not have a default standard of
review.
After selecting the vehicle of dismissal, this Comment then turns to the task
of assigning a standard of review. To do so, it employs the multifactor test that
the Supreme Court handed down in Pierce v. Underwood. Analysis under this
test reveals that the deferential standard’s historical pedigree entitles it to a
presumption of correctness that the plenary standard does not overcome. This
Comment lastly shows that this historical standard is supported by the
standards that apply to the other Rule 23.1 dismissals.
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment resolves a straightforward, but “uncommonly difficult,”1
issue. It is an issue that currently splits the federal circuit courts and has made
it all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, but remains unsettled.
The issue is this: In the federal court system, which standard of review—abuse
of discretion or de novo—should a circuit court apply when reviewing a
district court’s dismissal of a shareholder’s derivative action for failure to
allege demand futility?2
Before moving forward, it is helpful to unpack the main issue. A
“derivative action” is an action in which a shareholder causes his corporation
to sue the corporation.3 In order to bring this action, the shareholder must meet
certain requirements, one of which is to first make a demand on the board of
directors to bring the action on the corporation’s behalf. The directors usually
reject the demand, since they are typically the ones being sued. To circumvent
this predicament, the shareholder can abstain from making the demand and
argue that so doing would have been futile, given the board’s bias. At this
critical point, the district court will either allow the action to proceed, or
dismiss it for failure to allege demand futility. If the shareholder appeals, the
circuit court will have to review the dismissal and choose a standard by which
to do so. Under “abuse of discretion” review, also called “deferential” review,
the circuit court reviews the district court’s decision with deference.4 Under
“de novo” review, also known as “plenary” review, the circuit court reviews
the district court’s action without deference.5 This Comment answers the
question of which standard of review the circuit court should apply.
To resolve the main issue presented, this Comment must also resolve a
sub-issue. The sub-issue—which also is unsettled in the courts—is this: what is
the proper procedural vehicle for making the demand futility dismissal? Four
contenders emerge from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules):
(i) Rule 12(b)(1), providing for dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; (ii) Rule 12(b)(6), providing for dismissal for failure to state a
1 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (characterizing the general task of choosing between
abuse of discretion and de novo review).
2 This Comment does not cover the district court’s denial of a demand futility motion to dismiss, since
the circuit courts lack jurisdiction to take this issue on appeal. E.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 236
(1945) (“[The] denial of a motion to dismiss . . . is not immediately reviewable.”).
3 See infra Part I.A.
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra Part I.B.
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claim upon which relief may be granted; (iii) Rule 41(b), providing for
dismissal for failure to comply with the Rules; and (iv) Rule 23.1,6 which
provides the requirements to bring a derivative action. Standards of review
have already been assigned to the former three vehicles, so placing the demand
futility dismissal under any of them would dispose of the main issue. However,
no standard has been assigned to Rule 23.1 dismissals.
The main issue emerged only recently, but with great momentum. Since the
dawn of demand futility, the standard of review has been abuse of discretion.
Delaware—“the Mother Court of corporate law”7—changed this. The Supreme
Court of that State, in its 2000 case of Brehm v. Eisner, abandoned deferential
review in favor of plenary review.8 This decision, and the de novo trend in
general, is supported by two arguments: (i) the demand futility dismissal is a
dismissal on the pleadings for lack of legal sufficiency, which is reviewed de
novo; and (ii) as a dismissal on the pleadings, the circuit court is in just as good
a position to make the determination as is the district court. Brehm was met
with an immediate and prolonged effect at both the state and federal levels.
Outside of federal court, New Jersey,9 Nevada,10 and the District of
Columbia11 have all followed Brehm.12
At the federal level, the response to Brehm started as talk, but then turned
into action. Three circuits—the Second Circuit,13 the District of Columbia
Circuit,14 and the Ninth Circuit15—all spoke favorably of plenary review, but
none abandoned their well-established deferential standards. Finally, in 2013,
the First Circuit expressly adopted de novo review in Unión de Empleados de
Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Financial Services Inc. of

6 In this Comment, “Rule 23.1” refers to Rules 23.1(a)–(b), but does not include Rule 23.1(c), unless
stated otherwise.
7 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 500
U.S. 90 (1991).
8 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000) (overruling Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
1984)).
9 In re PSE & G S’holder Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 313 (N.J. 2002).
10 Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Nev. 2006).
11 Behradrezaee v. Dashtara, 910 A.2d 349, 362 (D.C. 2006).
12 But see Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2003) (rejecting Brehm).
13 Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 137 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Kautz v. Sugarman,
456 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2011) (further acknowledging the open question in Scalisi).
14 Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 783 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
15 Israni v. Bittman, 473 F. App’x 548, 550 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing in part Laborers Int’l Union of N.
Am. v. Bailey, 310 F. App’x 128, 130 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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Puerto Rico (Unión de Empleados).16 This created an apparent circuit split,
prompting the Supreme Court to take up the issue.
Although the issue made it before the Nine Justices, it slipped out of their
hands before they could decide on it. The Court granted certiorari in Unión de
Empleados on June 24, 2013.17 Meanwhile, the case was also on remand to the
district court, which dismissed it on July 9, finding that the plaintiffs had lost
their derivative standing by selling their shares.18 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court dismissed the petition on August 26.19 This dismissal does not mean,
however, that the issue is now either settled or unimportant. To the contrary, it
is an issue that the Court deems worthy of discussion.
The Supreme Court deems the issue worthy of discussion not because of its
academic intrigue, but because derivative actions and standards of review are
of great practical importance. The derivative action is important for two
reasons. First, it is an essential component of American corporate
governance,20 since it is the primary legal mechanism for shareholders to hold
directors and officers accountable for wrongdoings against the corporation.21
Second, these actions are frequently enormous in terms of the financial
interests at stake.22 Standards of review are important because they frame the
issue on appeal, thereby establishing the division of labor between the trial and
appellate courts, and helping to determine appellate outcomes.23 The
convergence of these two phenomena, which comprises this Comment’s main
issue, is of great practical importance.
The main issue currently splits the circuit courts, and this split continues to
develop at a rapid pace. Just during the Unión de Empleados appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to add its weight to the

16

704 F.3d 155, 161–63 (1st Cir. 2013).
UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan,
133 S. Ct. 2857, 2857–58 (2013) (mem.).
18 Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R.,
No. 3:10-cv-01141-ADC (D.P.R. filed July 9, 2013).
19 UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan,
134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (mem.).
20 “Corporate governance” means the “management of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders in
compliance with laws and ethical standards.” JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 152 (9th ed. 2014).
21 See infra Part I.A.
22 See infra Part V.E.
23 See infra Part I.B.
17
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discussion. It chose to abandon its forty-seven-year-old deferential standard24
in favor of the plenary standard.25 This leaves the circuit split as follows. Six
circuits have issued opinions that expressly embrace deferential review—the
Second,26 Third,27 Ninth,28 Tenth,29 Eleventh,30 and District of Columbia
Circuits.31 Two circuits have expressly converted to de novo review—the
First32 and Seventh33 Circuits. Two other circuits—the Sixth34 and Eighth35
Circuits—also apply plenary review, but they adopted this standard only
recently and without even acknowledging the debate. The Fourth, Fifth, and
Federal Circuits have not spoken on the issue. Therefore, the circuit split is at
least 6–2 and at most 6–4, both in favor of deferential review. But, this
numerical advantage is misleading.
The deferential standard is now in a precarious position, opposed by a
strong de novo trend and hanging on by only a fragile majority. Since
Delaware’s decision in Brehm, the plenary standard has moved forward with
relentless momentum. Three of the six circuits in the deferential majority—the
Second, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits—have all issued opinions
speaking against deferential review.36 The Eleventh Circuit’s position stands
on a weak foundation, because it indirectly derives from Ninth Circuit
precedent.37 The Third Circuit’s position is also weakened, since it is based
mainly on precedent from the Second and Seventh Circuits.38 The only circuit
24

See Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1966) (adopting deferential standard).
See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2013).
26 Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 504 F. App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2012).
27 In re Merck & Co. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2007).
28 Israni v. Bittman, 473 F. App’x 548, 550 (9th Cir. 2012).
29 deHaas v. Empire Petrol. Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970), cited with approval in Cadle v.
Hicks, 272 F. App’x 676, 677 (10th Cir. 2008) (not a demand futility case).
30 Staehr v. Alm, 269 F. App’x 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2008).
31 Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 783 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
32 Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R.,
704 F.3d 155, 162–63 (1st Cir. 2013).
33 Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 2013).
34 In re Ferro Corp. Deriv. Litig., 511 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008).
35 Gomes v. Am. Century Cos., 710 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 2013).
36 See cases cited supra notes 13–15.
37 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the deferential standard in 1990. See Peller v. S. Co., 911 F.2d 1532,
1536 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Rothenberg v. Sec. Mgmt. Co., 667 F.2d 958, 960 (11th Cir. 1982)). Rothenberg
in turn cites two cases to support this standard. See Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 960 (citing Owen v. Modern
Diversified Indus., Inc., 643 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 1981) and Hornreich v. Plant Indus., 535 F.2d 550, 552
(9th Cir. 1976)). Further, Owen cites Hornreich to support the deferential standard. See Owen, 643 F.2d at 443.
38 See Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 1992). Blasband cited three cases in support of its
holding: Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983), Starrels v. First National Bank, 870 F.2d 1168,
25
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whose position is relatively isolated from the onslaught is that of the Tenth
Circuit.39 However, even this is probably weakened, since the Tenth Circuit’s
decision that adopted the deferential standard apparently relies on one of the
same sources that once supported the Seventh Circuit’s defunct deferential
standard.40
This Comment argues that the federal appellate courts—including the
Supreme Court—should reject the de novo trend and maintain the deferential
standard. As an intermediate step, it first argues that Rule 23.1 itself is the
proper procedural vehicle for the demand futility dismissal. Since this vehicle
does not already have a standard of review assigned to it, this Comment takes
on the task of assignment. To make this assignment, it is necessary to consider
the Supreme Court’s 1988 case of Pierce v. Underwood.41 This case provides a
multifactor test—with historical practice as the threshold factor—for choosing
between plenary and deferential review.42 Analysis under these factors reveals
that the deferential standard’s historical pedigree entitles it to a presumption of
correctness that the plenary standard does not overcome. Although this
argument is formalistic, it is also practical. This is because the Underwood
factors themselves are based on practical considerations regarding the division
of labor between the trial and appellate courts.
Some might argue—wrongly—that the answer to the main issue in this
Comment is a function of corporate governance policy. Effective corporate
governance indeed depends, to a great extent, on the derivative action.
Accordingly, any requirement to bring the derivative action—demand futility
in this case—is a matter of corporate governance. Likewise, it is tempting to
say that the demand futility dismissal’s standard of appellate review is a matter

1170 (7th Cir. 1989), and Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990). These sources are no
longer persuasive. First, the Second Circuit’s holding in Lewis was recently criticized by a panel of that court.
See Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 380 F.3d 133, 137 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004). Second, Starrel was recently overruled
by the Seventh Circuit. See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013).
Finally, as explained supra in note 37, the Eleventh Circuit’s arguments in favor of the deferential standard
have been weakened.
39 See deHaas v. Empire Petrol. Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
40 The Seventh Circuit used the deferential standard in Fields v. Fidelity General Insurance Co., 454
F.2d 682, 684–85 (7th Cir. 1971). To support this, the Seventh Circuit cited a District of Colorado opinion. Id.
at 685 n.3 (citing deHaas v. Empire Petrol. Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 813 (D. Colo. 1968)). The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding in 1970 and explicitly adopted the deferential standard at that time, though
it did not provide a rationale for doing so. deHaas, 435 F.2d at 1228. It is probable that the Tenth Circuit relied
on the district court’s reasoning.
41 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
42 Id.; see also infra Part V.
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of corporate governance. This is because the standard affects the likelihood of
successfully appealing a demand futility dismissal: deferential review makes it
less likely because it gives deference to the district court’s decision to dismiss;
plenary review makes it more likely because the circuit court can review the
matter anew. Thus, a promanagement policy would favor deferential review,
and a pro-shareholder policy would favor de novo review. However, neither of
these policies guides this Comment’s analysis.
Corporate governance policy is a nonissue for selecting a standard of
appellate review.43 This is the case for two reasons. First, standards of review
are not concerned with the likelihood of success on appeal, but with “the
relation between the trial court and the appellate court”44 most appropriate to
the particular type of case. Second, appellate review should not be used as a
tool to effect corporate governance policy. Again, there are two reasons why.
First, it is an ineffective tool because there is no certainty that the circuit courts
will effect the desired policy. Second, it is an inappropriate tool because it does
not exist to effect corporate governance policy, or even give the appellant a
second chance on appeal.45 Rather, it exists to ensure against “reversible error”
committed by the trial courts, and to interpret and exposit the law so as to
provide “clarity and guidance for citizens and for the lower courts.”46 The
proper means for effecting corporate governance policy is not to target the
appellate review of decisions based on applicable rules, but to target the rules
themselves—which is not the topic of this Comment. The only policies to
consider in selecting a standard of review relate to the proper division of labor
between the trial and appellate courts. Indeed, these are the policies that the
litigants and courts on both sides of the main issue have addressed in the
relevant cases, and they are also the policies that this Comment addresses.
This Comment’s focus is the demand futility dismissal’s standard of
review; but, the complexity of this main issue requires that the scope be
broader than just that. In Part III, this Comment provides a full analysis of the
43 This is not to say that corporate governance is an irrelevant concept. As explained earlier in the
Introduction, the derivative action is important in part because of its role in corporate governance. As such, it
is necessary to set forth a consistent standard of review for dismissals. This part of the Introduction merely
argues that the standard should not be assigned based on any particular corporate governance policy. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
44 In re Abbott Labs. Deriv. S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2003).
45 Cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (stating that “the trial . . . should be
‘the main event rather than a tryout on the road.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)
(some internal quotation marks omitted))).
46 RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.2, at 834 (3d ed. 2012).
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proper vehicle for dismissing a case for failing to allege demand futility, what
this Comment refers to as the “demand futility dismissal” (which easily applies
to other derivative action dismissals). This analysis may be useful for
addressing other procedural issues related to derivative actions, particularly
whether the preclusion doctrines apply with respect to derivative actions.
Additionally, in Part VI, this Comment essentially assigns standards of review
to the five other Rule 23.1 dismissals. This Comment’s major limitation is that
it might not be helpful for analyzing demand-related dismissals where the
demand requirement is universal, such that there is no demand-futility
exception.47 Which standard of appellate review applies in these dismissals is a
possible area for further research. Additional research may also include an
examination of the preclusion doctrines in derivative actions, as well as an
empirical study of what effect the conversion to de novo review has
precipitated in certain jurisdictions, particularly Delaware.
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part I provides a brief conceptual
background on both the derivative action and its requirements, as well as
standards of review. Part II explains and debunks arguments for making the
federal courts apply the state standard of review. Part III addresses the vehicle
of dismissal sub-issue and argues that Rule 23.1 is the proper vehicle for
making the demand futility dismissal. Part IV introduces the two arguments
behind the de novo trend, explains the first of these in depth, and presents two
counter-arguments. Part V conducts analysis under the Underwood test and
concludes that the outcome favors deferential review (Part V.C introduces and
argues against the second argument behind the de novo trend). Finally, Part VI
discusses how the standards of review applied to other Rule 23.1 dismissals
support the demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard.

47 Universal demand jurisdictions include the following jurisdictions, twenty-two of which have adopted
universal demand by statute, and by one through its case law. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-742 (2013);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-722 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(2) (2014); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-742 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-173 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-742 (West 2011);
IOWA CODE § 490.742 (2013); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 615 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13C, § 753
(West Supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 7.42 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1493a (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.42 (West Supp. 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-543
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2072 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.42 (West, Westlaw through ch.
172, 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-7-42 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.2-711(c)
(West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-742 (2007); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.553 (West 2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-740 (West Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (West Supp. 2014);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0742 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-742 (West 2007); Cuker v. Mikalauskas,
692 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. 2006).
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I. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Before entering the analytical parts of this Comment, it is helpful to first
provide a background on certain key concepts. This Part does so in two
sections. Section A explains the derivative action and its requirements,
particularly the demand requirement and its demand-futility exception. Section
B explains standards of review, particularly the de novo and abuse of
discretion standards, as well as the clearly erroneous standard.
A. The Derivative Action and its Requirements
This section A introduces the derivative action and its requirements. It does
so in the following five ways. First, it defines the derivative action. Second, it
gives an overview of the Rule 23.1 requirements to bring a derivative action.
Third, it briefly introduces the first five of these requirements. Fourth, it
explains the demand requirement and its demand-futility exception. Fifth, it
explains the equitable nature of the derivative action, the demand requirement,
and the demand-futility exception.
The derivative action is, at its core, a very simple concept. It is an action
that “one or more shareholders or members of a corporation or an
unincorporated association48 bring . . . to enforce a right that the corporation or
association may properly assert but has failed to enforce.”49 In other words, a
shareholder perceives that the corporation has been injured, but since neither
the directors nor officers will bring the action to remedy the injury, the
shareholder brings the action on behalf of the corporation.50 The shareholder’s
right to bring this action, along with the substantive law of derivative actions in
general is governed by state law, since corporations are almost always
incorporated at the state level.51
To bring a derivative action in federal court, the shareholder must comply
with Rule 23.1. This rule imposes six requirements: (1) the
continuous-ownership requirement;52 (2) the fair-and-adequate-representation

48 The Comment refers to corporations throughout because derivative actions usually involve
corporations, but it also applies to derivative actions involving entities other than corporations.
49 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
50 5 JEROLD S. SOLOVY, RONALD L. MARMER, TIMOTHY J. CHORVAT & DAVID M. FEINBERG, MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.1.02[1] (3d ed. 2013).
51 Cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991) (holding that state law generally
governs the substance of demand futility).
52 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
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requirement;53
(3) the
verification
requirement;54
(4) the
55
contemporaneous-ownership
requirement;
(5) the
non-collusion
requirement;56 and (6) the demand requirement,57 accompanied by its
demand-futility exception.58 The sixth requirement is governed in substance by
state law; Rule 23.1 merely contemplates its existence and provides the
applicable pleading standard.59 However, this substance-procedure dichotomy
does not affect this Comment’s analysis (unless otherwise stated) because this
Comment only addresses the dismissal where this contemplated requirement
actually exists. If the shareholder fails to satisfy any of these requirements,
then his potential derivative action is subject to dismissal.
Although this Comment focuses on demand futility, it also discusses the
other requirements, so some introduction is in order. (1) The
continuous-ownership requirement requires the shareholder to own stock in the
corporation at the beginning of and throughout the entire action.60 This
requirement is not explicitly stated in the Rules, but is implied from Rule
23.1’s language and based on the derivative action’s equitable nature.61 (2) The
fair-and-adequate-representation requirement requires that the shareholder
“fairly and adequately represent” the other shareholders.62 (3) The verification
requirement requires the shareholder to verify that he is the plaintiff to the
action, that he basically understands the contents of the complaint, and that he
believes the contents to be true.63 (4) The contemporaneous-ownership
requirement requires that the claimant was a shareholder in the corporation
when the harm allegedly occurred.64 (5) The non-collusion requirement
requires the shareholder to “allege that the action is not a collusive one to
confer jurisdiction that the court would otherwise lack.”65

53

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b).
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(1).
56 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(2).
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(A).
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3)(B).
59 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991).
60 E.g., Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).
61 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 1826 (3d ed. 2007).
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
63 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 1827.
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(1).
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(2).
54
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The demand requirement, along with its demand-futility exception, is the
most litigated of the Rule 23.1 requirements. It requires the shareholder to first
make a demand on the board of directors to rectify the injury that he believes
the corporation has suffered.66 The purpose of this requirement is to give the
directors the opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment that
the corporation would be best served by not bringing the litigation.67 As such,
it advances “the basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions of a
corporation—including the decision to initiate litigation—should be made by
the board of directors or the majority of shareholders.”68 The paradox of the
demand requirement is that the directors usually reject the demand (since they
are usually the alleged wrongdoers), and the shareholder is deemed to concede
to the directors’ good judgment and forfeit the derivative action by actually
making the demand.69 To remedy this paradox, the courts crafted an exception
to the demand requirement: demand futility. Demand futility excuses the
shareholder from making the demand if he can prove that to do so would have
been futile, given the directors’ bias.70
Demand futility is a doctrine at equity. To understand this, it is necessary to
first discuss the derivative action in general. This action is founded on the
shareholder’s right to sue on behalf of his corporation. This foundational right
was refused by the courts sitting at law.71 This left the shareholder defenseless
against “faithless officers and directors” who abused the corporation.72 To
remedy this mischief, the courts, sitting in equity, recognized the shareholder’s
right to bring the action.73 Thus, the derivative action lay at equity.74
Since the derivative action lay at equity, it is fitting that the requirements to
this action—including the demand requirement and its demand-futility
exception—are also equitable in nature. Indeed, it was the Supreme Court—
sitting in equity in the 1881 case of Hawes v. Oakland—that established all the
requirements (except demand futility) that eventually came to comprise Rule

66

E.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95–96 (1991).
E.g., id. at 96.
68 Id. at 101 (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 (1984)).
69 See, e.g., SOLOVY ET AL., supra note 50, § 23.1.08[1][ii] (discussing tactical advantage of not making
demand).
70 E.g., id. (explaining the standard under Delaware law).
71 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 E.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264–65 & n.2 (1917).
67
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23.1.75 The futility exception having developed only later, the Court
subsequently recounted that the “equity courts established as a precondition for
the [derivative] suit that the shareholder demonstrate that the corporation itself
had refused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary
conditions.”76 At the same time, the Court carried this history into the present
by noting that “[t]his requirement is accommodated by . . . Rule . . .
23.1[(b)(3)].”77
B. Standards of Review
This section B provides a conceptual background on standards of review. It
does so in the following four ways. First, it defines “standards of review” and
explains their importance. Second, it defines the “clearly erroneous” standard
and explains both its scope of application and underlying rationale. Third and
fourth, this section does the same for both the de novo and abuse of discretion
standards of review, respectively.
Standards of review—a concept of great importance to the appellate
process—are slippery things that often create confusion, but are at least easy to
define. Standards of review dictate the degree of deference that the appellate
court gives to the trial court’s determination.78 Thus, they are important to the
appellate process for three reasons. First, they help the circuit court “frame
[the] issues on appeal” and, second, limit its power to disturb the district
court’s decision.79 Third, they affect the appellant’s likelihood of success on
appeal, so much so that “an argument on appeal based on an incorrect standard
of review must fail.”80 Indeed, standards of review are so important that the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require litigants to brief the applicable
standard of review.81
Although the de novo and abuse of discretion standards are the focus of this
Comment, a brief introduction to the clearly erroneous standard is also in
order. This is because it provides a reference point for the two main standards

75 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881). For the historical development from Hawes to the contemporary Rule 23.1,
see Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 n.5 (1984).
76 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
77 See id.
78 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW §1.01 (4th ed.
2010).
79 19 GEORGE C. PRATT, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 206.01 (3d ed. 2013).
80 Id.
81 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B).
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and appears in the discussion later on.82 The clearly erroneous standard is the
only of the three standards that explicitly appears in the Rules. Rule 52(a)
provides that the circuit court shall not set aside the district court’s “[f]indings
of fact . . . unless clearly erroneous.”83 The rationale for affording such great
deference to the district court’s finding of fact is that district courts are
specialized in performing this function, and it would be unfair and inefficient
to make the appellee argue the facts again on appeal.84
The de novo standard of review gives wide latitude to the circuit court.
Under this standard, the circuit court reviews the record anew and renders a
decision without showing any deference to the district court’s decision.85 The
circuit courts apply this standard to the “trial court’s conclusions on questions
of the application, interpretation, and construction of law.”86 The rationale
behind so doing is that the circuit courts—comprised of judicial panels
presented with briefs based on settled records below—are better equipped than
the district courts to decide questions of law, and allowing them to do so
fosters “doctrinal coherence” within the circuits.87
The abuse of discretion standard of review gives narrow latitude to the
circuit courts. Under this standard, the circuit court will only overrule the
district court’s decision if it finds that there was an abuse of discretion. “Abuse
of discretion” means that “the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, upon an errant conclusion of law, or upon improper
application of law to the facts.”88 This deferential standard applies to the
district court’s “[d]iscretionary rulings and determinations.”89 Whether such a
ruling includes the demand futility dismissal is indeed one way to characterize
the main issue of this Comment. The rationale behind the deferential standard
is that the district court—having insight that the record does not always capture
due to its presence at the proceeding—is best equipped to make the ruling, and
the ruling is so particular to the specific facts that the circuit court cannot bring
any doctrinal coherence to the case law anyhow.90

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See infra Part VI.C.
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
See PRATT, supra note 79, § 206.03[3].
Id. § 206.04[1].
Id.
See id. § 206.04[2].
Id. § 206.05[1].
Id.
See id.
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II. APPLYING THE STATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Part discusses threshold arguments that must be addressed before
moving on to further analysis. Specifically, litigants have made two arguments
that circuit courts should apply the same standard of review as would the state
whose law governs the derivative action. The first argument proposes direct
application of the state standard, while the second proposes indirect application
based on a synthesis of Supreme Court precedent. If either of these arguments
prevails, then the main issue is resolved and further analysis is unnecessary.
Thus, it is appropriate to address them at this point in the Comment. This Part
concludes that both arguments fail, presenting the discussion in two sections.
Section A addresses direct application, and section B addresses indirect
application.
A. Directly Applying the State Standard of Review
The direct application argument seeks to provide an easy resolution to the
main issue: simply apply the state’s standard of review, whether deferential or
plenary. This section A proceeds in two stages. First, it explains how the
argument is justified through law and policy. Second, it provides two reasons
why this argument must fail.
Proponents of direct application find justification both in law and policy.
This discussion begins with law and turns to policy in the next paragraph. The
relevant law comes from the Supreme Court’s case of Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc.91 This case held that “a court . . . entertaining a
derivative action . . . must apply . . . demand futility . . . as it is defined by the
law of the State of incorporation.”92 State law arguably defines both the trial
court’s discretion to decide on demand futility, as well as the appellate court’s
power to review the ensuing dismissal.93 Thus, proponents suggest the circuit
court should review the demand futility dismissal under the same standard as
would the appellate court of the state of incorporation.94
Turning to policy, direct application claims two justifications. First, it could
benefit business because corporate managers may derive a sense of certainty
from knowing that a derivative action appeal will proceed the same in federal
91

500 U.S. 90 (1991).
Id. at 108–09. This is true, unless it is displaced by or conflicts with federal law or policy. Id.
93 See Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Reply Brief at 3–4, Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Medical
Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-7108), 2008 WL 838373.
94 Id.
92
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court as in state court.95 Second, direct application could discourage
forum-shopping,96 which is one of the twin aims of Erie.97 Forum-shopping
may result—and perhaps has already resulted—from divergent standards of
review in state and federal courts. Imagine that the applicable state standard of
review is de novo, and the federal standard is abuse of discretion.98 In this case,
the plaintiff has an incentive to sue in state court, where he gets a second shot
on appeal, and management has an incentive to remove to federal court to
prevent the plaintiff’s second shot. Now, imagine that the applicable state
standard of review is abuse of discretion, and the federal standard is de novo.99
In this case, the plaintiff stands to benefit from suing in federal court. This
creates inequity in diversity cases, since only out-of-state plaintiffs can take
advantage of this potential benefit. Although this inequity is tempered by the
fact that recovery goes to the corporation, not the shareholder, the incentive for
forum-shopping is still real.
Although direct application is attractive because it offers an easy answer
that carries potential benefits, it is untenable for two reasons. First, it violates
principles of judicial federalism. In diversity cases, federal courts must apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law.100 Therefore, “[b]ecause the
standard of review is a procedural matter, not a substantive one” it must be
governed by federal law.101 To allow state law to “govern the relation between
the trial court and the appellate court” would threaten “the uniform federal-law
approach [that] applies to procedural questions which concern the allocation of
responsibility between the trial court and appellate court.”102 Second, direct
application would obstruct the development of circuit precedent: to allow the

95 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 22 n.5, Lynch v. Rawls, 429 F. App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2011) (No.
09-17379), 2010 WL 6191855.
96 “Forum-shopping” means “[t]he practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which
a claim might be heard.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).
97 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468
(1965) (explaining the twin aims of Erie).
98 Indeed, this is now probably the most prevalent situation, since Delaware applies plenary review,
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000), but most federal circuit courts still apply deferential review.
See cases cited supra notes 27–31.
99 For example, if the Ninth Circuit converts to de novo review, then this would be the situation for an
appeal under Alaska law, since Alaska has refused to convert to de novo review. Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736,
745 (Alaska 2003).
100 E.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465.
101 Alison H. v. Byard, 163 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1998); see also In re Abbott Labs. Deriv. S’holders Litig.,
325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ppellate review is governed by federal law . . . .”).
102 In re Abbott Labs, 325 F.3d at 803.
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standard of review—the very “frame” of the opinion103—to vary from opinion
to opinion based on the applicable state law would make factually similar cases
mutually inapposite. To state these two negative arguments in the positive, the
standard for reviewing the demand futility dismissal in the federal courts must
be uniform and governed solely by federal law.
B. Indirectly Applying the State Standard of Review
The argument for indirectly applying a state’s standard of review uses a
more sophisticated approach to achieve the same ends as direct application.
This section B proceeds in two stages. First, it explains the argument’s
mechanics. Second, it concludes that indirect application fails for the same
reasons as direct application.
The indirect application argument proceeds by synthesizing two Supreme
Court cases. These two cases are Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.104
and Salve Regina College v. Russell.105 Kamen provides that state law governs
the substance of demand futility.106 Salve Regina provides that the circuit court
must review the district court’s determination of state law de novo.107
Therefore, if the applicable state law says that demand futility is a matter of
law,108 then Kamen requires the circuit court to recognize it as so. From there,
Salve Regina requires that the circuit court review this legal matter de novo.109
Likewise, if state law says that the matter is discretionary,110 then deferential
review is most appropriate. This argument is compelling because it presents
application of the state standard of review as an obligatory effect caused by
Supreme Court precedent.
Nevertheless, indirect application is merely a more sophisticated means to
the same ends sought by direct application. Since direct application failed
based on the ends, not the means, indirect application must fail for the same
reason. It obstructs judicial federalism and the development of precedent. In

103

See PRATT, supra note 79, § 206.01.
500 U.S. 90 (1991).
105 499 U.S. 225 (1991).
106 500 U.S. at 108–09; see also supra note 92.
107 499 U.S. at 231.
108 E.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000).
109 See Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 93, at 3.
110 E.g., James v. James, 768 So. 2d 356, 360 (Ala. 2000) (reaffirming that Alabama’s standard of review
for the demand futility dismissal is abuse of discretion).
104
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issuing Kamen and Salve Regina, the Supreme Court could not have intended
them to be read and synthesized so woodenly so as to cause this absurd result.
III. VEHICLE OF DISMISSAL
Rule 23.1 imposes requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to bring a
derivative action, but does not say anything about dismissing the action if the
shareholder fails to satisfy a requirement. Thus, the issue is this: when a court
makes a demand futility dismissal, what is the proper procedural vehicle for
this dismissal? The resolution to this sub-issue—which remains elusive in the
courts—is essential to resolving the main issue regarding standards of review.
This is because different standards of review attach to different vehicles of
dismissal.
In resolving this sub-issue, this Part discusses both Rule 23.1 dismissals in
general, as well as other specific Rule 23.1 dismissals. This is because a
uniform vehicle should apply to all Rule 23.1 dismissals to the greatest extent
possible. Uniformity is ideal in a normative sense because it simplifies judicial
administration by ensuring that the same standards and procedures apply to
these closely related dismissals.111 Uniformity is also correct in a positive
sense because the requirements were conceived and persist in a single group,112
share the same purpose of “protect[ing] the courts from collusive actions,
and . . . corporations and their officers and directors from strike suits,”113 and
are all highly fact specific. Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of the
appropriate vehicle of dismissal for each Rule 23.1 dismissal is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Further, at least one type of dismissal—the collusion
dismissal114—frustrates the goal of uniformity.115
The courts have long struggled to assign a vehicle of dismissal, but have at
least narrowed it down to a few contenders. There are four to consider
(presented in the order discussed below): (i) Rule 12(b)(1); (ii) Rule 12(b)(6);

111 Cf. 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1360 (3d
ed. 2004) (“The particular rationale the court utilizes to justify hearing a preliminary motion . . . largely
determines which principles will govern the presentation and resolution of that motion.”).
112 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881) (announcing the derivative action requirements in a
single paragraph); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530–31 n.5 (1984) (recounting that
Hawes conceived the requirements that eventually formed Rule 23.1).
113 Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 265 (9th Cir. 1964).
114 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(2) (requiring plaintiff to allege non-collusion).
115 For further discussion, see infra Part V.B.
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(iii) Rule 41(b); and (iv) Rule 23.1 itself.116 Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1 are by far
the main contenders, since they are the only ones that the circuit courts have
mentioned. Rules 12(b)(1)117 and 41(b)118 are less significant because the
circuit courts have not employed them, but are worthy of discussion because
the district courts have used them more than once. As some of the foregoing
cited cases demonstrate, the courts often provide multiple alternative vehicles
of dismissal. This practice is undesirable because it both complicates the
simple matter of dismissal and may cause problems where different vehicles
engender different standards and procedures.119 Thus, to the greatest extent
possible, the courts should avoid this practice by narrowing the dismissal down
to a single vehicle.
At this point, it is helpful to briefly introduce each of the contenders (other
than Rule 23.1). The Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is for “lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction,”120 which means the court lacks the “power to adjudicate the
case.”121 The Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted,”122 which (at least in relevant part) means the plaintiff
116 There are three other contenders that this Comment does not consider. The first is Rule 12(c)
(judgment on the pleadings). E.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming Rule
12(c) motion to dismiss for failure to allege demand futility). This Comment does not consider Rule 12(c)
because it “merely serv[es] as an auxiliary or supplementary procedural device” for raising Rule 12(b)
defenses “after the close of the pleadings.” 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, § 1367. The other two
contenders are Rule 12(e) (motion for more definite statement) and Rule 12(f) (motion to strike). A treatise on
federal procedure implies that these are viable vehicles by saying that they are the proper vehicles for
dismissing complaints that fail to plead special matters and by discussing the derivative requirements as
special matters. However, this Comment does not cover these rules because they are entirely off the judicial
radar, and the secondary source itself neither discusses vehicles of dismissal with respect to derivative actions
in particular nor cites any authority indicating that these rules are appropriate for channeling demand futility
dismissals. See DAVID F. HERR, ROGER S. HAYDOCK & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, MOTION PRACTICE § 9.04[D]
(2014).
117 See, e.g., Arnold v. McClendon, No. CIV-11-986-D, 2012 WL 4483159, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28,
2012) (“[T]he ‘case law is unclear’ as to whether the issue is analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). . . .
[M]ost courts appear to conclude that the issue . . . ‘can be raised on either a Rule 12(b)(1) or a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.’” (citations omitted)).
118 See, e.g., C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Scor U.S. Corp., No. 92 CIV. 2093 (LMM), 1992 WL 309610, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1992) (“Dismissal . . . is appropriate, pursuant to Rule 41(b) . . . . for failure to . . . verif[y]
[the] complaint.”); Baffino v. Bradford, 57 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Minn. 1972) (making demand futility dismissal
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6), 12(c), 41(b), and 56); see also 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 1827 (stating
that Rule 41(b) is proper vehicle for verification dismissal); Edmund C. Ursin, Recent Development,
Verification as a Safeguard Against Abuse of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1225 &
n.23 (1966) (same).
119 Cf. 5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, § 1360.
120 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
121 2 MILTON I. SHADUR, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[1] (3d ed. 2014).
122 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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has failed to file a complaint containing “sufficient factual matter” to state “a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”123 The Rule 41(b) dismissal is for
failure to “prosecute or to comply with [the] [R]ules or a court order”124 and is
made “to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid
congestion in the calendars of the courts.”125
Vehicles of dismissal are an important concept because they may dictate
how the appellate court will review the grant or denial of a motion. If it is
12(b)(1)126 or 12(b)(6),127 then the standard is de novo. If it is Rule 41(b), then
it is abuse of discretion.128 If it is Rule 23.1 itself, then the courts are not bound
by the dictates of any other rule and can choose the standard most appropriate
for the demand futility dismissal.
This Part proceeds in four sections. Section A collects circuit court cases,
located after an exhaustive search, that have announced a standard of review
for the demand futility dismissal and surveys what vehicle they used for the
demand futility dismissal. Section B discusses and debunks Rule 12(b)(1) as a
contender. Sections C and D discuss Rules 12(b)(6) and 41(b) respectively, and
conclude that they are possible, but weak, contenders. Through the process of
eliminating the above contenders, this Part ultimately concludes that Rule 23.1
is the most appropriate vehicle for making the demand futility dismissal.
A. Vehicles of Dismissal Used by the Circuit Courts
This section A collects circuit court cases that have announced a standard
of review for the demand futility dismissal and surveys what vehicle of
dismissal they have used. This survey yields three findings. First, the courts
generally neglect the issue and announce inconclusive rulings, even when
directly faced with the issue. Second, (despite the first finding) the circuit court
cases fall into two camps: those that favor Rule 23.1 and those that favor Rule
12(b)(6). Third, a slight majority of the cases favor Rule 23.1. This is to be
expected, since the traditional rule of deferential review is incompatible with
the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, which is reviewed de novo. This survey provides
the necessary starting point for further analysis: Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6) both
123

See SHADUR, supra note 121, at § 12.34[1][a].
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
125 8 CHARLES L. BRIEANT, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 41.50[1] (3d ed. 2014).
126 E.g., Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2014).
127 E.g., Haag v. United States, 736 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2013).
128 See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (stating that dismissing a case for failure
to prosecute—which falls under Rule 41(b)—is within district court’s discretion).
124
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enjoy credibility and are the main contenders. From here, this Comment goes
on to argue that Rule 23.1 should prevail. This section A proceeds by
analyzing the cases in the Rule 23.1 camp, then the Rule 12(b)(6) camp.
The Rule 23.1 camp and the Rule 12(b)(6) camp each consists of different
case groups. Within the Rule 23.1 camp, there are four groups: (i) those that
speak of the Rule 23.1 dismissal and the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as separate
procedures (including cases from the Second129 and Ninth130 Circuits);
(ii) those that ostensibly make Rule 23.1 the vehicle of dismissal (including
cases from the Second,131 Third,132 Seventh,133 Ninth,134 and District of
Columbia135 Circuits); (iii) those that definitely make Rule 23.1 the vehicle of
dismissal (including cases from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits);136 and (iv)
those that cast doubt on deferential review, favor de novo review, or do both,
but still make Rule 23.1 the vehicle of dismissal—either ostensibly137 or
definitely.138 These groups all support the notion of the independent “Rule 23.1

129

See, e.g., Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 504 F. App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2012) (referring separately to “dismissals
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)” and “dismissals based on FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1”).
130
See, e.g., Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Trust Fund, IBEW v. Dunn, 352 F. App’x 157, 159 (9th Cir. 2009)
(similar to Lambrecht).
131
See, e.g., Kautz v. Sugarman, 456 F. App’x 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal for failure to
“comport with the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1”).
132
See, e.g., Baca v. Crown, 458 F. App’x 694, 698 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal “for failure to allege
demand futility”).
133
See, e.g., Garber v. Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal for failure “to set forth
sufficient pleadings to excuse demand pursuant to Federal Rule 23.1”).
134
See, e.g., Starrels v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming demand
futility dismissal for failing to “allege with particularity facts which would have excused [the plaintiff] from making
a demand upon the directors”).
135
See, e.g., Gaubert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 863 F.2d 59, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal
because plaintiff’s “allegations of demand futility lacked the requisite particularity”).
136 See Peller v. S. Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1535–36 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The Companies initiated their motion
to dismiss . . . pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) . . . . However, . . . derivative suits are governed by FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.1, and the district court correctly reviewed the Companies’ motion under this rule.”); Robison v.
Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 926 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1966). In Robison, the district court presented failure to state a claim
as the basis for dismissal in its order, but the modern equivalent of Rule 23.1 as the sole basis in the
memorandum opinion. 356 F.2d at 926 & n.3. The circuit court explicitly noticed this discrepancy and selected
the procedure in the memorandum opinion to affirm the dismissal. Id.
137 See Israni v. Bittman, 473 F. App’x 548, 550 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (questioning propriety of
discretionary review), aff’g Fosbre v. Matthews, No. 3:09-CV-0467-ECR-RAM, 2010 WL 2696615, at *8 (D.
Nev. July 2, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss based on Rule 23.1).
138 See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 783 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (endorsing de novo review), aff’g In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., Deriv., & “ERISA” Litig.,
503 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 n.1 (D.D.C. 2007) (making clear distinction between Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and Rule
23.1 dismissals and deliberately dismissing under latter); Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 137
& n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (endorsing conversion from deferential to plenary review, yet ruling as follows: “[T]he
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dismissal.” The fourth group merely adds that this vehicle of dismissal should
carry plenary review.
The Rule 12(b)(6) camp also consists of different case groups. There are
three: (i) the Sixth139 and Eighth140 Circuit cases, which make Rule 12(b)(6)
the vehicle and apply de novo review; (ii) those that make Rule 23.1 the
vehicle, but are prefaced in the district court decision by a discussion of Rule
12(b)(6) standards;141 and (iii) those that make Rule 12(b)(6) the vehicle of
dismissal, yet apply deferential review.142 The first group (i.e., the Sixth and
Eighth Circuit cases) firmly supports Rule 12(b)(6) as a contender and is
logically coherent in that the cases apply the standard of review that applies to
that vehicle (i.e., plenary review). The second group could support Rule
12(b)(6) or Rule 23.1: on one hand, since Rule 12(b)(6) standards are
necessary for analyzing demand futility dismissals, they are in fact Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals; on the other hand, the overlap in standards may merely
indicate that they share similarities as dismissals on the pleadings, not that they
are one in the same.143 The third group represents both the conceptual
difficulty of this Comment’s main issue and the unfortunate blunders that
sometimes result. That is, the circuit court knows that it should review the
demand futility dismissal deferentially; it doesn’t know which vehicle of
dismissal to use and mistakenly uses Rule 12(b)(6); this is wrong, since Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed de novo.

district court . . . [denied] Defendants’ . . . Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but grant[ed] Defendants’ motion pursuant to
Rule 23.1. . . . [W]e affirm.”).
139 See In re Ferro Corp. Deriv. Litig., 511 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808,
817, 826 (2000) (reviewing demand futility dismissal as Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and under plenary standard),
amended on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001).
140 See Gomes v. Am. Century Cos., 710 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 2013) (reviewing demand futility
dismissal as failure to state a claim and under plenary standard).
141 See, e.g., Staehr v. Alm, 269 F. App’x 888, 891 (11th Cir. 2008) (reviewing for abuse of discretion
without mentioning 12(b)(6)), aff’g In re Coca-Cola Enters., Inc. Deriv. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1373–74,
1381 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (prefacing discussion with Rule 12(b)(6) standards, but dismissing pursuant to Rule
23.1).
142 See Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1087 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2011)
(deliberately categorizing demand futility dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), yet reviewing deferentially), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012); Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 174–75 (3d Cir.
2007) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, yet reviewing for abuse of discretion).
143 Cf. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731, 738 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (denying demand-futility
motion to dismiss because not made until post-answer—as applies to Rule 12(b)(6) motions—but not
mentioning Rule 12(b) in any fashion).
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B. Rule 12(b)(1) as a Contender
The first contender to discuss is Rule 12(b)(1). Although Rule 12(b)(1) is
not a main contender, its discussion is appropriate at this point because it
dovetails into the Rule 12(b)(6) discussion, which appears in the next section.
The argument for Rule 12(b)(1)144 is that demand futility is a matter of
“standing”145 or “derivative standing,”146 and dismissals for lack of standing
fall under Rule 12(b)(1).147 This section B proceeds in three stages. First, it
explains the different types of standing. Second, it explains that these different
types fall under different rules. Third, it explains how this understanding
debunks Rule 12(b)(1) as a contender.
Standing comes in two different types, as explained by the Ninth Circuit’s
case of Cetacean Community v. Bush.148 In general, “standing” refers to “[a]
party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or
right.”149 “Standing involves two distinct inquiries. First, an Article III federal
court must ask whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the
‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III.”150 This is called “Article III
standing.” “Second, if a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to satisfy Article
III, the court must ask whether a statute has conferred ‘standing’ on that
plaintiff.”151 This is called “statutory standing” or “prudential standing.”
Dismissals for lack of Article III standing and statutory standing fall under
different rules. A dismissal for lack of Article III standing falls under Rule
12(b)(1) because a lack of Article III standing equates to a lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, which falls under Rule 12(b)(1).152 In contrast, a
dismissal for lack of statutory standing has nothing to do with the court’s
144 See Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 93, at 4–5 & nn. 1–2 (arguing that the demand
futility dismissal should be reviewed de novo because it is for lack of standing).
145 E.g., 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1961 (2004) (“The requirement of demand upon directors is a
matter of standing . . . .” (emphasis added)).
146 E.g., First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“The shareholder derivative standing requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 involve prudential
limitations, not constitutional limitations.” (emphasis added)).
147 E.g., United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 114 n.6 (1st Cir. 1992) (choosing Rule 12(b)(1) as
vehicle for lack-of-standing dismissal when faced with choice between that rule and Rule 12(b)(6)). But see
Rental Hous. Ass’n of Greater Lynn, Inc. v. Hills, 548 F.2d 388, 391 (1st Cir. 1977) (dismissing for lack of
standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)).
148 386 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2004).
149 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
150 386 F.3d at 1174.
151 Id. at 1175.
152 Id. at 1174.
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jurisdiction; rather, it concerns only the claimant’s ability to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, which is handled by Rule 12(b)(6).153
After Cetacean Community, the Ninth Circuit in Simmonds v. Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC154 tackled head-on the tension between Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6). Based on the reasoning from Cetacean Community, the
Simmonds court held that demand futility is a matter of statutory standing,155 so
the ensuing dismissal falls under Rule 12(b)(6).156 This holding aligns with the
understanding that “[j]urisdiction is conferred by act of Congress,” not the
Rules.157 Thus, Simmonds debunks Rule 12(b)(1) as a viable contender. At the
same time, it makes a strong case for Rule 12(b)(6). However, Simmonds
doesn’t win the case for either Rule 12(b)(6) or de novo review. As for Rule
12(b)(6), the case merely veils “statutory standing” in the language of Rule
12(b)(6). It is equally, if not more, viable to take off the veil and let the
statutory standing dismissal fall under the rule or statute whose requirement is
not satisfied. As for de novo review, Simmonds works against it and in favor of
deferential review because the opinion still reviewed the dismissal for abuse of
discretion.158
C. Rule 12(b)(6) as a Contender
The second contender to discuss is Rule 12(b)(6). The primary argument
that has been made for Rule 12(b)(6) is that the language of Rule 23.1 does not
provide for dismissal, so the demand futility dismissal falls under Rule
12(b)(6). The secondary argument, which is original to this Comment, is that
history also supports Rule 12(b)(6). This section C proceeds in five pieces.
First, it discusses a major problem of placing the demand futility dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), which is preclusion. Second and third, it explains and
then refutes the primary argument in favor of Rule 12(b)(6), respectively.
Fourth and fifth, it does the same for the secondary argument.

153

Id. at 1175.
638 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
155 Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1087 n.6; accord First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Trust v. United States,
194 F.3d 1279, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that “Rule . . . 23.1 involve[s] prudential limitations, not
constitutional limitations” and that the Supreme Court case of Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan
Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331 (1990) “associat[ed] the ‘shareholder standing rule’ with prudential standing
requirements”).
156 638 F.3d at 1087 n.6.
157 Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 265 (9th Cir. 1964).
158 638 F.3d at 1087.
154
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The major problem with placing the demand futility dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) relates to the preclusion doctrines. The preclusion doctrines include
“claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion.” Claim preclusion provides that a
claimant cannot bring a claim that he has already brought in a prior case.159
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues already decided in a prior case.160 In
general, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are claim preclusive.161 In contrast, demand
futility dismissals are generally issue preclusive at most.162 This means that
subsequent claimants can pursue the action, but not relitigate the issue of
demand futility. Accordingly, it would cause significant confusion to meld
issue preclusive and claim preclusive procedures.
The primary argument against Rule 23.1 and in favor of Rule 12(b)(6) is
textual in nature. The text of Rule 23.1 imposes (or contemplates)
requirements, but provides no grounds for actually dismissing a case. The only
place where the Rules provide for dismissing a case on the pleadings is Rule
12(b), of which Rule 12(b)(6) is the only appropriate option in this context.
Thus, the only vehicle through which to dismiss an action for failure to satisfy
a Rule 23.1 requirement is Rule 12(b)(6).163 This argument is persuasive, but
unsatisfactory.
The above argument is too rigid and ignores the inherent power of the
courts. “In practice numerous . . . preliminary motions are presented to and

159

See, e.g., FREER, supra note 46, § 11.2, at 574.
See, e.g., Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 829 (2009).
161 See 27A TRACY BATEMAN FARRELL, JOHN R. KENNEL, KARL OAKES, ELIZABETH WILLIAMS, ANN K.
WOOSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 62:465 (Lawyers ed. 2008); 2 SHADUR, supra note 121, § 12.51. But see
5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)
(stating that claim preclusive effect of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is constant in federal question cases, but
depends on state law in diversity cases).
162 E.g., In re Sonus Networks, Inc., S’holder Deriv. Litig., 499 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2007). In Sonus—the
leading federal case on preclusion in derivative actions—the court compared Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals with
demand futility dismissals and found that they are “not entirely analogous.” Id. at 62. Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals
are for failure to state a claim, so they are claim preclusive. In contrast, demand futility dismissals are for
failure to satisfy a precondition to the action; such a failure, if cured, would permit a second action. Id. at 61.
As such, the dismissal should not be claim preclusive. However, issue preclusion should apply to the
determination in the prior action that the precondition was required. Id. at 62. But see Bazata v. Nat’l Ins. Co.
of Wash., 400 A.2d 313, 316 (D.C. 1979) (holding that demand futility dismissal is claim preclusive “[i]n light
of the particularity of Rule 23.1’s instructions and the particularity with which the facts surrounding the
demand must be pleaded”). For an in-depth discussion of preclusion in derivative actions, see 2 JOSEPH M.
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 9:25–9:27 (10th ed. 2013).
163 Opening Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant at 28, Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 504 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-1285), 2011 WL 3796595. The appellant also mentioned Rule 12(c) as a viable vehicle, id., but this
Comment has already dispelled Rule 12(c) as a candidate. See supra note 116.
160
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determined by the federal courts” outside of Rule 12(b).164 Relying on their
“inherent power,” “[f]ederal courts . . . traditionally have entertained certain
pre-answer motions that are not expressly provided for by the [R]ules or by
statute” including those that “are necessary to effectuate other specific
provisions in the [R]ules.”165 To effectuate Rule 23.1, the Rules require the
dismissal of actions that fail to meet its requirements, and the courts have the
inherent power to determine the vehicle through which to make these
dismissals. They are not confined to Rule 12(b)(6) due to the less than explicit
language of Rule 23.1.
The secondary argument against Rule 23.1 and in favor of Rule 12(b)(6) is
that the merger of law and equity has so affected motions practice that
dismissal for failure to meet any of the derivative requirements under Rule
23.1 must fall under Rule 12(b)(6). Two premises lead to this conclusion. First,
as explained in Part I, section A, the derivative requirements developed at
equity; before the merger of law and equity, the vehicle for the derivative
requirement dismissal was the dismissal “for want of equity.”166 Second, the
subsequent merger of law and equity gave rise to a new motion—the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. According to the Eighth
Circuit, this motion “is a substitute . . . for the motion to dismiss for want of
equity.”167 The logical summation of these two historical premises is that the
derivative requirement dismissal—including the demand futility dismissal—
falls under Rule 12(b)(6).
But, this historical argument is unsatisfactory for the same reasons as is the
primary textual argument. The Eighth Circuit made a sweeping statement that
leaves the courts with no flexibility. It would be an absurd result to let this
rigid rule mandate the classification of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) that do
not belong. Such a mandate would also undermine the inherent power of the
federal courts.
To conclude the Rule 12(b)(6) discussion, this Comment contends that the
two formalistic arguments in favor of Rule 12(b)(6) are inherently
unsatisfactory and fail to outweigh the problem regarding preclusion. Further,
all those cases that place the demand futility dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)—
specifically those from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits—should not affect the
164
165
166
167

5C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 111, § 1360.
Id.
See Venner v. Great N. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 24, 34 (1908).
Dennis v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 151 F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1945).
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courts’ future analyses,168 since they assigned that vehicle without
acknowledging the problem with this approach.
D. Rule 41(b) as a Contender
The third contender to discuss is Rule 41(b). Rule 41(b) is an even weaker
contender than Rule 12(b)(6). This section D proceeds in two stages. First, it
narrows the discussion to a specific part of Rule 41(b) and concedes that it is
viable as a textual matter. Second, it argues that Rule 41(b) is a very weak
contender as a practical matter.
Before entering the analysis, it is necessary to first establish which part of
Rule 41(b) proponents argue addresses the Rule 23.1 requirements. The
pro-Rule 41(b) sources169 do not zealously support their contender. Not only
do they neglect to make any actual argument for Rule 41(b), they do not even
state which part of Rule 41(b) applies. This Comment can only make an
educated guess. Rule 41(b), in its first sentence, provides that the defendant
may move for the plaintiff’s involuntary dismissal if the plaintiff fails to do
any of the following: (i) prosecute the case; (ii) comply with the Rules; or
(iii) comply with a court order.170 Only the second scenario—noncompliance
with the Rules—can be said to address failure to satisfy a Rule 23.1
requirement. This classification indeed makes sense, but only as a textual
matter.
As a practical matter, Rule 41(b) it is not a serious contender. This is the
case for two reasons. First, it enjoys sparse and weak support. Second, it
carries with it many problems, similar to Rule 12(b)(6)’s problem regarding
preclusion. As for the first reason, no circuit courts appear to have endorsed
this vehicle. Very few district courts have used it.171 And, the Northern District
of California, in an unpublished opinion, rejected its use, saying it “is not
well-suited to serve as a mechanism for challenging the adequacy of
allegations of demand futility.”172 Although the California court declined to
state its reasoning, this Comment once again makes an educated guess,
pointing out three difficulties with this potential vehicle.

168
169
170
171
172

2011).

See supra notes 139–40 citing cases.
See sources cited supra note 118.
See FED R. CIV. P. 41(b).
See cases cited supra note 118.
In re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. C 10-3392 RS, 2011 WL 5444262, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
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First, the Rule 41(b) and Rule 23.1 dismissals differ in application and
purpose. The Rule 41(b) dismissal “is intended to serve as a rarely
employed . . . tool of judicial administration available to district courts in
managing their specific cases and general caseload.”173 In contrast, the
derivative requirement dismissal is a common event (at least in derivative
actions). Further, it is not an administrative or case-management tool; rather, it
is a procedural mechanism for enhancing corporate governance: “[t]he purpose
of Rule [23.1] is to protect the courts from collusive actions, and to protect
corporations and their officers and directors from strike suits.”174
Second, the two dismissals are analytically different. Whether to grant a
Rule 41(b) dismissal requires the district court to conduct a multifactor test,
which varies among the circuits.175 The Rule 23.1 requirements are already
numerous and carry their own requirements and standards, which vary
according to the applicable state law.176 To meld the Rule 41(b) tests with the
Rule 23.1 requirements would create an unwieldy analysis.
Third, the method for raising the dismissal may also cause a problem. Rule
41(b) “permits a district court to dismiss sua sponte.”177 Although the sua
sponte dismissal of a derivative action for failure to satisfy a Rule 23.1
requirement does not smack of impropriety, it is at least not common
practice.178 Rather, the common practice is for the plaintiff to allege
satisfaction of the requirements, the defendant to move to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the requirements, and the court to make a ruling.
To conclude the Rule 41(b) discussion, this rule is not a viable contender
because it lacks judicial support and poses many practical problems.
As the sub-conclusion to this Comment, this Part concludes that Rule 23.1
is the best vehicle for making the demand futility dismissal. This conclusion is
supported by the foregoing process of elimination. To use any of the other
contenders would be to force a square peg into a round hole: they are not
well-suited to handle the demand futility dismissal. In contrast, by allowing

173

Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004).
See Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 265 (9th Cir. 1964).
175 See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2369 (3d
ed. 2008).
176 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
177 FREER, supra note 46, § 7.4, at 356.
178 Of all the cases cited in this Comment that involve Rule 23.1, none were dismissed sua sponte.
174

HIRSCH GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

9/18/2014 10:43 AM

DISMISSING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

229

Rule 23.1 to stand on its own weight, the courts can apply and develop
procedures that make sense for this particular type of dismissal.
IV. COMPARING THE DEMAND FUTILITY DISMISSAL TO THE RULE 12(B)(6)
DISMISSAL: THE INERTIA BEHIND THE DE NOVO TREND
The inertia behind the de novo trend has not been the merger of the demand
futility dismissal with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; rather, it has been their
comparison. At its greatest elaboration, the comparison is twofold: first, both
are dismissals on the pleadings for lack of legal sufficiency; second, as
dismissals on the pleadings, the circuit court is in just as good a position to
make the determination as is the district court.179
This Part proceeds in two sections. Section A explains the first point of
comparison and its scope of acceptance. Section B then presents two relevant
counterarguments. The first counterargument addresses the first point of
comparison, and the second addresses the overall comparison. Later on, this
Comment further debunks the comparison in Part V, and specifically address
the second point of comparison in Part V, section C.
A. Dismissal on the Pleadings for Lack of Legal Sufficiency
This section A explains the first point of comparison and its scope of
acceptance. The first point of comparison is best explained through the
following syllogism. Since a shareholder can only bring a derivative action by
successfully alleging demand futility, demand futility goes to the legal
sufficiency of the pleadings. The legal sufficiency of the pleadings is a matter
of law.180 Matters of law are reviewed by the appellate courts de novo.181
Therefore, de novo review should apply to the demand futility dismissal.
Many of the federal courts leading the de novo trend have endorsed the first
point of comparison. The Second Circuit spoke in favor of de novo review on
the basis of this comparison.182 The District of Columbia Circuit did the same:
“the question whether demand is excused turns on the sufficiency of the
complaint’s allegations; and the legal sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations

179
180
181
182

See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000) (making both arguments).
Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 137 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id.
See id.
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is a question of law we typically review de novo.”183 Finally, the First Circuit
delivered its decision in Unión de Empleados, noting this as one of its reasons:
“[a]s a general matter, rulings concerning the legal sufficiency of pleadings are
reviewed de novo. There is no justification for treating the pleadings in a
derivative suit differently.”184
Other courts that also review the demand futility dismissals de novo are
less explicit in their reasoning, but would probably accept the first point of
comparison. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits don’t even need a comparison,
since they directly place the demand futility dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).185
The Seventh Circuit just recently made the formal conversion to de novo
review in Westmoreland County Employee Retirement Systems v. Parkinson.186
Although it did not explain its reasoning, it did cite its previous holding in In
re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation.187 In that derivative
action, the court reviewed a demand futility dismissal de novo on the basis that
“[a]ppellate review of the legal precepts used by the district court and the
court’s interpretation of those precedents is plenary.”188 Thus, all of the courts
in the de novo camp are in agreement: demand futility is a matter of law.
B. Two Counterarguments
This section B presents two counterarguments against plenary review. The
first counterargument specifically addresses the first point of comparison; the
second addresses the overall comparison. The first point of comparison is not
entirely accurate because the demand futility dismissal and Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal serve different purposes. The Northern District of Illinois has
explained the difference as follows:
“In contrast to a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a Rule
23.1 motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand is not intended
to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ substantive claim.
‘Rather, its purpose is to determine who is entitled, as between the

183

Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779, 783 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

2008).
184

Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R.,
704 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 2013).
185 See supra Part III.A.
186 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013).
187 325 F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2003).
188 Id.
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corporation and its shareholders, to assert the plaintiff’s underlying
189
substantive claim on the corporation’s behalf.’”

The question of who is best positioned to control the corporation by carrying it
into litigation is arguably best left to the sound discretion of the trial court to
resolve.
The overall comparison of the demand futility dismissal to the Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is inaccurate because they are procedurally different. If a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is reversed, the facts will be reheard at trial. In
contrast, if a demand futility dismissal is reversed, the facts surrounding the
demand are forever silenced. Therefore, the decision on demand futility is
essentially the “trial” for these facts. The outcome of this trial has a real-world
effect: it determines who—the board or the shareholder—has the right to take
the corporation into litigation. Given the trial-like nature of the demand futility
decision, it is best left to the discretion of the district court.190
V. UNDERWOOD ANALYSIS
Having debunked the threshold arguments and left a clean slate by making
Rule 23.1 the vehicle for dismissal, this Comment now turns to the task of
assigning a standard of review to the demand futility dismissal. To make this
assignment, it is necessary to consider the Supreme Court’s 1988 case of
Pierce v. Underwood.191 This case provides a multifactor test specifically
designed to determine whether a particular action of the district court is best
reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. Given the pertinence of
Underwood, it is odd that it has not been applied by any of the courts or
litigants that have passed on the main issue presented by this Comment.
The Underwood test is not a mathematical equation for calculating
standards of review, but is a very useful analytical framework—not to mention
the law of the land. The Court in Underwood began by recognizing that it can

189 Oakland Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Massaro, 772 F. Supp. 2d 973, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (quoting In re
Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., 434 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Levine v. Smith, Civil
Action No. 8833, 1989 WL 150784, at *5 (Del. Ch. 1989) (reviewing demand futility dismissal for abuse of
discretion), aff’d 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 n.13 (Del. 2000)
(reviewing demand futility dismissal for abuse of discretion)))). Although Delaware, the source of this
reasoning, eventually discarded it, nothing prevents the federal courts from continuing to use it.
190 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 8, UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Unión de Empleados de Muelles de
Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013) (No. 12-1208), 2013 WL 2152646.
191 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
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be “uncommonly difficult” to assign a standard of review.192 As such, the
Court announced that it was not setting forth “a comprehensive test,”193 nor
one that was “rigorously scientific.”194 Despite this humble disclaimer, the
Underwood test is “instructive” and provides “helpful direction” when
choosing between deferential and plenary review.195 Therefore, even if one
disagrees with this Comment’s interpretation or analysis of Underwood, the
courts should nevertheless apply Underwood to assign the demand futility
dismissal’s standard of review.
The Supreme Court in Underwood constructed the test as follows. It
requires the courts to first consider the historical standard of review, followed
by four “significant relevant factors:”196 (i) the language and structure of the
governing law; (ii) the judicial actor who is best positioned to decide the issue;
(iii) the extent to which the issue lends itself to rule-making; and (iv) the
financial interests at stake. This Part proceeds in five sections: Sections A
through E. These sections track the Underwood factors, beginning with
historical practice.
This Comment concludes that the Underwood test favors the demand
futility dismissal’s deferential standard. This conclusion is supported by the
following three reasons. First, the deferential standard’s historical pedigree
entitles it to a presumption of correctness as per Underwood’s historical
practice factor. Second, the deferential standard prevails under the second and
third significant relevant factors—administration-of-justice and rule-formation.
Third, although the standard fails under the first and fourth factors—
language-and-structure and financial-interests—this failure does not justify
abandoning the standard.
A. Historical Practice
The demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard of review is
presumptively correct because of its historical pedigree. Historical practice is a
factor that holds a special place in the Underwood test. This is the case for the
following two reasons. First, the Court separately discussed historical practice

192

Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
194 Id. at 563.
195 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 78, § 4.01[2].
196 Underwood, 487 U.S. at 559. See generally, 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 78, § 4.01 (providing a
holistic discussion of Underwood).
193
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before discussing the “significant relevant factors.”197 This indicates that
historical practice is the threshold factor, or at least a relatively more important
factor. Second, the Court stated that (for most trial court determinations) the
standard of review “is provided by a long history of appellate review.”198 Thus,
“precedential characterizations of specific issues should weigh heavily in a
given application.”199
To the extent that historical practice does not seriously conflict with
contemporary necessity, deference to historical practice is ideal. This is
because doing so brings certainty to the law, which fosters integrity in the legal
system and thus greater efficiency in business. As the old saying goes, “if it
ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”200 With respect to standards of review, historical
pedigree is particularly important. This is because the standard of review is the
foundation of any appellate opinion. To change the standard of review is to
undermine the validity of past appellate opinions. This causes uncertainty in
the development of precedent, which undermines integrity in the legal system
and thus diminishes efficiency in business.
This section proceeds in three subsections. Subsection 1 explains the
deferential standard’s historical pedigree. Subsection 2 argues that the plenary
standard wrongly flouts the historical standard. Subsection 3 discusses and
debunks the strongest argument to disturb historical practice.
1. The Deferential Standard’s Historical Pedigree
This subsection 1 argues that the deferential standard’s historical pedigree
entitles it to a presumption of correctness, and makes the following three
points. First, the deferential standard is an old, prevalent, and uniform
standard. Second, the standard has persisted into the modern era. Third, the
historical standard does suffer a major—but not fatal—weakness.
The demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard of review emerged
generations ago, has become very prevalent, and has been uniformly applied.
This standard of review finds authority dating back at least 100 years. As the
Supreme Court recounted in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, the
demand-futility exception entered the Equity Rules in 1912, “apparently
197

See Underwood, 487 U.S. at 558–59.
Id. at 558.
199 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 78, § 4.01[2].
200 See HUGH RAWSON & MARGARET MINER, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 297
(2d ed. 2006) (spoken by Bert Lance).
198
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intended to codify a judicially recognized exception . . . where, in the
discretion of the court, a demand may be excused.”201
Moving into the modern era, the circuit courts have reinforced the
deferential standard over the past half-century. In 1963, the Ninth Circuit was
the first circuit court to explicitly endorse the deferential standard.202 In 1966,
the Seventh Circuit followed suit.203 In the 1970s, three circuits—the First,204
Second,205 and Tenth206 Circuits—all adopted the standard. In the 1980’s, two
circuits—the Third207 and District of Columbia208 Circuits—both adopted the
standard. In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit finally joined the bunch.209 Within just
one year of the writing of this Comment and notwithstanding the strong trend
in favor of plenary review, the circuit courts have handed down two
abuse-of-discretion opinions.210
The deferential standard’s major—but not fatal—weakness is its lack of
judicial rationale. Among the numerous abuse-of-discretion cases, very few
state a satisfactory rationale for employing the standard. The only apparent
reason for this omission is that the courts thought that deferential review was
obviously the correct choice, so no discussion was necessary. The Second and
Ninth Circuits can trace their practices back to the conclusory statement that
“probably the most straightforward approach is to admit frankly that it lies
within the sound discretion of the court to determine the necessity for a
demand.”211 Even worse, the First,212 Third,213 Seventh,214 and Tenth215

201

464 U.S. 523, 530 n.5 (1984) (emphasis added).
DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1963).
203 Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1966), abrogated by Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret.
Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013).
204 Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977), abrogated by Unión de Empleados de Muelles de
Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R., 704 F.3d 155, 162 (1st. Cir. 2013).
205 Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1978).
206 deHaas v. Empire Petrol. Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970).
207 Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 783 (3d Cir. 1982), abrogated by Garber v. Lego 11 F.3d 1197 (3d Cir.
1993).
208 Gaubert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 863 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
209 Peller v. S. Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990).
210 Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 504 F. App’x 23, 25 (2d Cir. 2012); Israni v. Bittman, 473 F. App’x 548, 550
(9th Cir. 2012).
211 The language quoted here appeared in various iterations of the second edition of Moore’s Federal Practice
treatise. See, e.g., 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.1.19 (2d ed. 1975); 3 JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.19 (2d ed. circa 1963). The Second Circuit in Elfenbein v. Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc., and the Ninth Circuit in DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co., both quoted this
language as it appears in the text of this Comment. See Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 450 (2d
Cir. 1978); DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Circuits all adopted the standard without stating any rationale. The District of
Columbia Circuit then arrived at its standard by relying on precedent from the
Second and Seventh Circuits.216 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit showed some
ingenuity, making an analogy to the fair-and-adequate representation
dismissal’s deferential standard of review, which in turn came from an analogy
to the class action denial.217 Nevertheless, this lack of judicial rationale is not
fatal: to overcome the presumption of correctness, the plenary standard cannot
rely on the deferential standard’s own lack of judicial rationale; rather, it
should rely on its own rationale to overcome the presumption. This it fails to
do.
2. The Plenary Standard’s Arbitrary Usurpation
This subsection makes two points. First, the plenary standard stands on a
relatively stronger judicial rationale than the deferential standard. Second, the
plenary standard’s emergence is nevertheless unsound because it is arbitrary.
In contrast to the deferential standard, the plenary standard has received
substantial judicial rationalization. This is not surprising, since the
establishment of a rule from scratch inherently requires less justification than
the abandonment of that rule in favor of a new one. As explained in Part IV,
the plenary standard’s rationale is twofold: first, the demand futility dismissal
is (supposedly) a dismissal for lack of legal sufficiency on the pleadings;
second, as a dismissal on the pleadings, the circuit court can make the
determination just as well as the district court.218 Given the plenary standard’s
stronger judicial rationale—that is, compared to no rationale for the deferential

212 See Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977), abrogated by Unión de Empleados de Muelles
de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R., 704 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 2013).
213 See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 783 (3d Cir. 1982), abrogated by Garber v. Lego 11 F.3d 1197 (3d
Cir. 1993).
214 See Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1966), abrogated by Westmoreland Cnty. Emp.
Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2013).
215 See deHaas v. Empire Petrol. Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970).
216 Gaubert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 863 F.2d 59, 68 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Lewis v. Graves,
701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Fields v. Fid. Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 684–85 (7th Cir. 1971)).
217 See Peller v. S. Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990). Peller cited Rothenberg v. Security
Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 960 (11th Cir. 1982), which reviewed a dismissal of a class action for lack of
adequate representation for abuse of discretion. Rothenberg cited two other such cases, with the former citing
the latter in support of applying an abuse of discretion standard: Owen v. Modern Diversified Industries, Inc.,
643 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 1981) and Hornreich v. Plant Industries, Inc., 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976).
Hornreich in turn borrows the standard applied to class-certification denials. For further discussion, see infra
Part VII.A.
218 See supra Part IV.
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standard—the courts’ adoption of it is understandable. But, they have done so
in haste. The courts have ignored Underwood, and in so doing have ignored the
weight of the deferential standard’s historical pedigree.
The conversion from deferential to plenary review219 is unsound because it
arbitrarily disregards the deferential standard’s historical pedigree. The
rationale for plenary review is nothing more than a delayed reaction to the
original and inherent qualities of the demand futility dismissal: it’s a dismissal
on the pleadings, which go before both the district and circuit courts. These
qualities—too obvious to have ever been overlooked—are the exact same
qualities that faced the judges of old. With this knowledge, those judges
repeatedly set down the deferential standard for future judges to follow.
Nothing—except perhaps judicial temperament—has changed so as to permit
the conversion. Unless the de novo courts can cite some change—either in
doctrine, thought, society, or elsewhere—their conversion is arbitrary and thus
unjustifiably flouts an historical practice integrally built up with the law of
derivative actions.
3. The Merger of Law and Equity as a Nonstarter for Plenary Review
There is only one change that could possibly—but ultimately does not—
justify the conversion. This change is the merger of law and equity. Given this
change’s significance, it is worth discussing. This subsection 3 proceeds in
three stages. First, it explains the argument that the deferential standard is
equitable in origin. Second, it explains how this origin threatens its survival.
Third, it explains why this threat is not real.
It has been argued that the deferential standard originated at equity. As
explained in Part II, section A, demand futility originated at equity. This
origin, according to the Union de Empleados petitioner, both explains and
justifies deferential review.220 At equity, the trier of fact enjoys a wide degree
of discretion in shaping and delivering relief. The Supreme Court has said so
repeatedly: “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the
219 There was arguably no conversion in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, since they adopted plenary review
without having previously adopted deferential review. See McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817, 826 amended
on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001); Gomes v. Am. Century Cos., 710 F.3d 811, 815 (8th Cir.
2013). However, the deferential standard was already so well established that for these cases to hold otherwise
makes them conversionary.
220 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Unión de Empleados de Muelles de
Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013) (No. 12-1208), 2013 WL 1400213.
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particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.”221 Given
this flexibility, the circuit courts have traditionally deferred to the district
courts in exercising their equitable powers. Therefore, as a ruling at equity, the
district court’s demand futility dismissal should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion.
Ironically for the Unión de Empleados petitioners, their argument is easily
turned against them. As the Supreme Court stated bluntly in the derivative
action of Ross v. Bernhard, “[u]nder the [R]ules, law and equity are
procedurally combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the
procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the court.”222
Therefore, the petitioners’ theory cannot possibly serve as a justification for
deferential review in the modern era. Further, if the deferential standard is in
fact based on equitable origins, then it arguably lacks any support and should
be replaced by the more robust plenary standard.
The “equity theory turn around” does not defeat deferential review. There
are four reasons why, all of which mainly hinge on the equity theory’s own
failings. First, the circuit courts explicitly adopted deferential review223 only
after the merger of law and equity,224 so they probably did not even consider
equity in crafting the standard. Second, the circuit courts have never invoked
equity to support the deferential standard. Third, the standard is not necessarily
a product of equity, since there is no hard-and-fast rule requiring that matters at
equity be reviewed deferentially.225 Fourth, even if deferential review
originated at equity, this does not mean that it is not justified today by the
Underwood factors, particularly the historical practice factor.
B. Language and Structure
After historical practice, the first of Underwood’s significant relevant
factors, requires the courts to consider “the language and structure of the

221 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944), cited with approval in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
222 396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970) (emphasis added).
223 DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 830 n.7 (9th Cir. 1963) (announcing standard in
explicit terms for the first time).
224 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d
ed. 2002) (stating that the “Rules . . . came into effect on September 16, 1938”).
225 See Lead Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 93, at 6 n.6 (citing in part Trudeau v. FTC, 456
F.3d 178, 182–83 (D.C. Cir. 2006), which reviewed de novo the district court’s determination regarding
declaratory and injunctive relief, both equitable remedies)).
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governing statute.”226 On this factor, this Comment concedes that the language
and structure do not favor deferential review. However, as explained below,227
this is not fatal to the deferential standard. This section B proceeds as follows.
To begin, it resolves a threshold issue that determines the course of analysis
under the first Underwood factor. It then moves into a two-stage analysis. The
first stage considers the language itself. The second stage considers the
structure by comparing the language to two other closely related rules.
The threshold issue is this: what is the “governing statute” for analyzing
the demand futility dismissal under Underwood? This Comment concludes that
the answer is Rule 23.1. This rule “speaks only to the adequacy of the
shareholder representative’s pleadings” and does not govern the substance of
demand futility.228 Thus, the governing statute as to the substantive law is
generally a state statute in diversity cases, and a federal statute in federal
question cases.229 However, neither of these should serve as the “governing
statute” for purposes of Underwood analysis. Regarding the state statute, Part
II has already argued that state law cannot determine the federal standard of
review. Regarding both state and federal statutes, to allow a particular statute
to determine the standard of review would undermine uniformity; this is best
avoided unless the applicable federal statute explicitly establishes a standard of
review. This process of elimination leaves Rule 23.1 as the only option.
Indeed, this is correct option, since it provides for a uniform standard derived
from federal law. Although it is only the “governing law” with respect to
procedure, this should suffice; the standard of review is also just a matter of
procedure.230
Having established Rule 23.1 as the governing statute for purposes of
Underwood, this section B now turns to the language and structure analysis.
The language of Rule 23.1 does not support deferential review. To analyze
Rule 23.1’s language, Underwood itself provides a useful point of comparison.
In that case, the governing statute read in critical part “unless the court
finds.”231 This language, according to the Court, “emphasizes the fact that the
determination is for the district court to make, and thus suggests some

226

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988).
See infra Part V.E.
228 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991).
229 See id. at 100 n.6.
230 See Alison H. v. Byard, 163 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 1998).
231 Underwood, 487 U.S. at 559 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012))).
227
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deference to the district court upon appeal.”232 In contrast, no such language
appears in Rule 23.1.
Rule 23.1’s structure also lends no support to deferential review. To
analyze structure, it is necessary to compare Rule 23.1 with other provisions in
the Rules. The most apt points of comparison are Rules 23.1(c) and
23(c)(1)(A). This comparison arguably requires expanding the governing
statute to include the Rules in general; this may or may not be technically
correct for purposes of Underwood, but the comparisons are nevertheless
useful.
The comparison with Rule 23.1(c) is particularly revealing and damaging
to the demand futility’s deferential standard of review. This rule—which
immediately follows the demand-futility exception—provides that “[a]
derivative action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only
with the court’s approval.”233 Rule 23.1(c) explicitly invokes the discretion of
the district court. Indeed, the circuit courts routinely review such decisions for
abuse of discretion.234 Given Rule 23.1(c)’s clear language and close location
to demand futility, it is reasonable to infer that the drafters knew how to direct
appellate deference in the context of derivative actions and deliberately chose
against doing so with respect to demand futility.235
A separate comparison with Rule 23(c)(1)(A) is also useful, as well as
damaging to the demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard.
Rule 23(c)(1)(A) governs class action certification236 and is an appropriate
point of comparison because of its close relationship with the Rule 23.1
requirements.237 This rule provides that “the court must determine . . . whether
to certify the . . . class.”238 Like Rule 23.1(c), Rule 23(c)(1)(A) clearly invokes
the discretion of the trial court. And, as with derivative action settlements, the
circuit courts routinely review class certification denials for abuse of

232

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (emphasis added).
234 E.g., City P’ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd. P’ship, 100 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (1st Cir. 1996).
235 But see Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 n.5 (1984) (recounting demand futility as
“a judicially recognized exception . . . where, in the discretion of the court, a demand may be excused”
(emphasis added)).
236 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
237 See infra Part V.A.
238 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
233
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discretion.239 This comparison thus further indicates that drafter deliberately
withheld deference with respect to the demand futility requirement.
C. Administration of Justice
The second significant relevant factor under Underwood requires the courts
to determine whether, “as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.”240 This has been one of the main battlegrounds in the plenary versus
deferential war. Many de novo opinions have claimed total victory on this
front. This Comment concludes that the victory belongs to deferential review.
This section C proceeds in three stages. First, it argues that district courts
are better positioned to determine demand futility. Second, it presents the de
novo courts’ counterargument. Third, it argues that the de novo courts’
counterargument is unpersuasive because it ignores broader principles that
underpin the trial–appellate court relationship.
District courts are better positioned to determine demand futility because it
is a fact-specific inquiry. Under Rule 23.1(b)(3), “the complaint must plead
facts with particularity that are specific to the individual board members and
the specific claims at issue.”241 Demand futility thus “depends on the unique
pleadings of each case under consideration”242 and is “essentially a factual
issue.”243 It is precisely this understanding that led the circuit courts to review
only for abuse of discretion: “the decision as to whether a plaintiff’s
allegations of futility are sufficient to excuse demand depends on the
particular facts of each case and lies within the discretion of the district
court.”244 Most recently, the Supreme Court of Alaska, in declining to follow
Delaware’s conversion to plenary review, acknowledged that “the question of

239 E.g., Harden Mfg. Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 712 F.3d 60,
70 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
240 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1988) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 220, at 21–22.
242 Kaster v. Modification Sys., Inc., 731 F.2d 1014, 1020 (2d Cir. 1984).
243 In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 192 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
244 Gaubert v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 863 F.2d 59, 68 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)
(quoting Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1040
(3d Cir. 1992) (“Generally, the district court’s determination of demand futility depends upon the facts of each
case and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (emphasis added)).
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demand excuse potentially also involves fact-based analysis which is better
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”245
But, the de novo courts prefer to take the facts upon themselves. According
to them, the trial court is in no better position to determine demand futility.
This is because the facts surrounding demand futility are all in the pleadings,
which all go into the appellate record. This gives the appellate court the
opportunity to decide the issue just as well as the trial court. As the Delaware
Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n a Rule 23.1 determination of pleading
sufficiency, the Court of Chancery, like this Court, is merely reading the
English language of a pleading and applying to that pleading statutes, case law
and Rule 23.1 requirements.”246 The First Circuit subsequently adopted this
reasoning in Unión de Empleados: “[a] district court is no better positioned
than we are to read and evaluate a complaint” in a derivative action.247 In the
terms of Underwood, this argument admittedly carries some weight, since none
of the information surrounding demand futility is “known only to the district
court.”248
However, the de novo courts’ position is unpersuasive because it focuses
on just one aspect of appellate review, ignoring broader principles that
underpin the trial-appellate court relationship. There are four principles to
consider. First, although the relevant facts are all on the record, “the district
court may [still] have insights not conveyed by the record,” such as “whether
particular evidence was worthy of being relied upon.”249 Second, even where
the circuit court can acquire “the district judge’s full knowledge of the factual
setting[,] . . . that acquisition will often come at unusual expense, requiring the
court to undertake the unaccustomed task of reviewing the entire record.”250
Third, this high-cost endeavor yields little benefit, since “[d]uplication of the
trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely contribute only
negligibly to the accuracy of [the] fact[-based demand futility] determination at
a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”251 Fourth, “the [management
defendants] to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their
energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account of the
245

Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2003) (emphasis added).
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
247 Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Serv. Inc. of P.R.,
704 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 2013).
248 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988).
249 Id. (emphasis added).
250 Id.
251 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985).
246
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[demand] is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more judges at
the appellate level is requiring too much.”252 The shareholder’s opportunity to
argue demand futility before the district court “should be ‘the main event
rather than a tryout on the road,’”253 especially since demand futility is not
reheard at trial.254
D. Rule Formation
The third significant relevant factor under Underwood requires the courts to
determine whether demand futility is “a multifarious and novel question, little
susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization.”255 If it is, then
it is “likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule will
permit to develop.”256 This section D concludes that deferential review prevails
under this factor.
The issue of demand futility is not susceptible to useful generalization. This
is because demand futility depends on the particular facts of each case.257
Underwood itself provides a useful point of comparison. In that case, the Court
determined the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees under a certain federal
statute.258 Although the Court could have reasonably generalized the facts that
would have justified the attorney’s fees, it declined to do so.259 Rather, it held
that each case is so particular that the determination is best directed to the
sound discretion of the district court.260 Likewise, while the circumstances that
trigger demand futility may be susceptible to reasonable generalization, they
are resistant to useful generalization.
E. Financial Interests
The fourth and final of the significant relevant factors under Underwood
requires the courts to consider the financial interests that hinge on the district
court’s demand futility ruling.261 The larger the financial interests, the greater
252

See id. at 575.
See id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)) (some internal quotation marks
omitted).
254 See supra Part IV.B.
255 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988) (emphasis added).
256 Id.
257 See supra Part V.C.
258 Underwood, 487 U.S. at 555.
259 See id. at 562.
260 Id.
261 See id. at 563.
253
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the case for plenary review; the smaller the financial interests, the greater the
case for deferential review. The financial interests at stake in derivative actions
are significant. For example, in Unión de Empleados, the shareholders were
seeking to recover at least $75.7 million.262 In comparison, the Court in
Underwood indicated that the $1,129,450 legal fee at issue in that case could
be substantial enough.263 Thus, the fourth Underwood factor does not favor the
demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard. Nevertheless, as explained
below, this defeat is not fatal to the standard.
Overall, the Underwood test supports the demand futility dismissal’s
deferential standard of review. The standard’s historical pedigree entitles it to a
presumption of correctness as per Underwood’s threshold factor. It then
prevails under the second and third significant relevant factors—administration
of justice and rule formation. Although it does not prevail under the first and
fourth factors—language-and-structure and financial-consequences—this is not
fatal. This is the case for two reasons. First, the former three winning factors
outweigh the latter two losing factors. Second, the standard’s failure under
these two standards does not inherently justify its abandonment. This is
because the relevant circumstances pertaining to these two factors—the
language of Rule 23.1 and the financial interests at stake in derivative
actions—are the same now as when the circuit courts first explicitly announced
the deferential standard. For the courts to now change the historical standard
while the underlying circumstances remain unchanged is unjustifiably
arbitrary.
VI. OTHER 23.1 DISMISSALS
The standards of review applied to five other Rule 23.1 dismissals further
support the demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard of review.264 This
comparison is appropriate because courts should review all Rule 23.1
dismissals under a uniform standard, to the greatest extent possible, for the
same reasons that justify a uniform vehicle of dismissal.265 To determine the
uniform standard, this Comment proposes that the standard for any other Rule
262 See Unión de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan v. UBS Fin. Serv. Inc. of
P.R., 704 F.3d 155, 161 (1st Cir. 2013). The shareholders complained that defendants caused them to lose 10%
on a $757 million investment. See id.
263 See 487 U.S. at 557, 559 (holding fourth factor still favored deferential review because legal fee at
issue was an abnormally high outlier).
264 For an overview of the other Rule 23.1 dismissals, see supra Part I.A.
265 See supra Part III.
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23.1 dismissal should guide or follow the demand futility dismissal’s standard
depending on the strength of its foundation, considering factors such as
historical pedigree, prevalence, and judicial rationale. This Part consists of five
sections that conduct this analysis for each of the five other Rule 23.1
dismissals, respectively.
A. Fair-and-Adequate Representation
The demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard of review receives
strong support from the representation dismissal. This dismissal is reviewed for
abuse of discretion (including, in chronological order of adoption, in the
Ninth,266 Sixth,267 Fifth,268 Eleventh,269 and Third270 Circuits) and is well
founded. As these cases indicate, the standard is both time-honored and
prevalent. Also, no circuit court appears to have challenged it. The Eleventh
Circuit has even relied on this standard to reach its deferential standard of
review for demand futility dismissals.271
The representation dismissal’s deferential standard is also based on strong
judicial rationale. It began in the Ninth Circuit’s 1976 case of Hornreich v.
Plant Industries, Inc.272 Hornreich serves as the foundation for this standard in
all other circuits (except the Third Circuit, which has provided no case law to
support its standard). Looking backward, Hornreich based its standard on an
analogy to class certification denials, which the circuit courts review for abuse
of discretion.273 The rationale for reviewing the certification denial
deferentially is found in the Second Circuit’s 1969 case of City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.274 According to that case, class
266 Hornreich v. Plant Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976); accord Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363,
1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Hornreich, 535 F.2d at 552); see also Biophotonic Tech., Inc. v. Davis, No. 91-15103,
1992 WL 31850, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 1992) (citing Larson, 900 F.2d at 1364).
267 Owen v. Modern Diversified Indus., Inc., 643 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Hornreich, 535 F.2d
550).
268 Smith v. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Larson, 900 F.2d at 1364).
269 Rothenberg v. Sec. Mgmt. Co., 667 F.2d 958, 960 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Owen, 643 F.2d at 443).
270 Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy Ltd., 725 F.2d 204, 205 (3d Cir. 1983).
271 See Peller v. S. Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Rothenberg, 667 F.2d at 960).
272 535 F.2d at 552.
273 E.g., Harden Mfg. Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.), 712 F.3d 60,
70 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 786 (2013).
274 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969). The jurisprudential link from the class certification denial to the
representation denial is as follows: Hornreich cites Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668,
673 (9th Cir. 1975) and Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1975). Ruteledge directly cites
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., and Clark indirectly cites it through Price v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 501
F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1974).

HIRSCH GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

9/18/2014 10:43 AM

DISMISSING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

245

certification denials are best reviewed for abuse of discretion because the
fact-intensive inquiry of whether it is most fair and efficient for a litigation to
proceed as a class or individual action is best decided “by a trial judge who has
knowledge of the actual problems presented in the courtroom by these
multi-plaintiff, multi-defendant cases.”275 Likewise, although the class action is
perhaps more complex than the derivative action in terms of the number of
parties involved, the question of whether it is fair for a shareholder to assert a
claim on behalf of a corporation is also best to left to the trial judge.
B. Verification
The verification dismissal is (and should remain) reviewed for abuse of
discretion, which further supports the demand futility dismissal’s deferential
standard. However, the rationale that supports the verification dismissal’s
standard should be rejected. The Third Circuit established the standard in the
1982 case of Lewis v. Curtis by adopting the demand futility dismissal’s
deferential standard.276 The court’s linking of verification to demand poses no
problem, but its linking of demand to deferential review most certainly does.
The court made the link to deferential review based on a rule announced in
Cramer v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.,277 and this is where it
erred.
The Cramer rule has no bearing on standards of review. In that case, the
shareholder alleged demand futility based on the special litigation
committee’s278 opposition to the action after the commencement of the suit.279
The district court rejected this argument, and the Third Circuit affirmed,
stating, “[t]he futility of making the demand . . . must be gauged at the time the
derivative action is commenced, not afterward with the benefit of
hindsight.”280 The Lewis court read this to mean that the demand futility
dismissal should be subject to only deferential review because the circuit court

275
276

See 410 F.2d at 297–98.
671 F.2d 779, 787 (3d Cir. 1982), abrogated by Garber v. Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1206–07 (3d Cir.

1993).
277 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); see Lewis, 671 F.2d at 787 (citing Weiss v. Temp. Inv. Fund, Inc., 520 F.
Supp. 1098, 1100 (D. Del. 1981)). The court in Weiss, in turn, cited Cramer. Weiss, 520 F. Supp. at 1100.
278 A “special litigation committee” is “[a] committee of [unbiased] directors assigned to investigate the
merits of a . . . derivative [action] and . . . to recommend maintaining or dismissing the [action].” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1526 (9th ed. 2009). A special litigation committee is useful where some of the directors are
biased, such that a demand on them would be futile.
279 See 582 F.2d at 276.
280 Id.
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has the benefit of hindsight. This reading is wrong. The circuit court has no
benefit of hindsight in this respect. The managers argue demand required at the
district court level. Both courts have the benefit of hindsight in this respect.
Both must ignore it.
C. Contemporaneous Ownership
The contemporaneous-ownership dismissal is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, which further supports the demand futility dismissal’s deferential
standard. In 2008, the Tenth Circuit said that the standard of review for
contemporaneous-ownership dismissals is generally abuse of discretion,
although it applied de novo review because a question of law was at stake.281
In 1969, the Fifth Circuit held a contemporaneous-ownership dismissal
“erroneous,”282 indicating application of the clearly erroneous standard. The
holding is not technically correct, since this standard applies to the district
court’s findings, not actions.283 However, this holding does not necessarily
discredit the case. The clearly erroneous standard is also deferential,284 so the
Fifth Circuit may have meant abuse of discretion instead. Alternatively, the
court may have meant that the contemporaneous-ownership requirement is so
fact-specific that the finding of fact and ultimate dismissal are inseparable.
Both theories favor and justify deferential review.
D. Continuous Ownership
The standard of review for the continuous-ownership dismissal is de novo,
but should be abandoned because it is an ill-founded rule that is apparently
isolated to one circuit. As such, it should have no bearing on any of the other
Rule 23.1 dismissals. The continuous-ownership dismissal’s plenary standard
is only clearly supported by the Ninth Circuit’s 1999 case of Kona Enterprises,
Inc. v. Estate of Bishop and its progeny.285 Kona’s only basis is a case stating
that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed de novo.286 The link between Rule
12(b)(6) and continuous ownership goes unstated by the court. The link can
perhaps be inferred from the court’s reference to the requirement as a matter of

281

Cadle v. Hicks, 272 F. App’x 676, 677 (10th Cir. 2008).
Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1969).
283 See infra Part II.B.
284 See infra Part II.B.
285 179 F.3d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1999), cited with approval in Quinn v. Anvil Corp., 620 F.3d 1005, 1012
(9th Cir. 2010).
286 See 179 F.3d at 769 (citing Cohen v. Stratosphere Corp., 115 F.3d 695, 700 (9th Cir. 1997)).
282
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“derivative standing”287 (i.e., statutory or prudential standing). As explained
above with the discussion of Cetacean Community and Simmonds, the lack of
statutory standing can be addressed to Rule 12(b)(6).288 However, this doesn’t
help Kona, since Simmonds applied deferential review even after holding that
the dismissal was under Rule 12(b)(6).289 Further, Kona breaks from the Ninth
Circuit’s long tradition of reviewing other Rule 23.1 dismissals for abuse of
discretion,290 without providing any reason for so doing.
E. Collusion
The way in which courts review collusion dismissals also supports the
demand futility dismissal’s deferential standard of review. The collusion
dismissal comes in two different types: (i) the “type 1 collusion dismissal” is
for actual collusion; and (ii) the “type 2 collusion dismissal” is for failure to
allege non-collusion. Each dismissal is subject to a different standard of
review. This is because, as alluded to above,291 each type is handled by a
different vehicle of dismissal. This section E explains both types of collusion
dismissals in terms of their vehicles of dismissal and standards of review.
The type 1 collusion dismissal is reviewed de novo, but this is has no
bearing on the demand futility dismissal’s standard of review. This is because
the two dismissals go through different vehicles of dismissal. As explained
above, the demand futility dismissal cannot proceed through the Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.292 In contrast, the type 1
collusion dismissal must proceed through Rule 12(b)(1) or a similar rule
because it is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. This is because collusion
destroys federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1359. As such, while the
dismissal may additionally invoke Rule 23.1, it must invoke a jurisdictional
rule, such as § 1359,293 Rule 12(b)(1),294 or Rule 12(h)(3).295 And, as a
jurisdictional dismissal, the standard of review is de novo.296

287

Id.
See supra Part III.B.
289 See supra Part III.B.
290 See cases cited supra notes 202 and 266.
291 See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
292 See supra Part III.B.
293 In City of Detroit v. Dean, the Court dismissed a derivative action for actual collusion pursuant to the Act of
March 3, 1875. 106 U.S. 537, 541 (1883) (citing Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 472). The Act of
March 3, 1875 is “the predecessor to § 1359.” 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 1830.
294 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction[.]”).
288
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In contrast, the type 2 collusion dismissal goes through the same vehicle as
the other Rule 23.1 dismissals, and its standard of review supports the demand
futility dismissal’s deferential standard. Turning first to the vehicle of
dismissal, if the shareholder fails to allege non-collusion, and the court does
not suspect actual collusion, then the ensuing dismissal is for lack of statutory
standing, not jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is improper to invoke a jurisdictional
rule, and proper to invoke a procedural rule, such as Rule 23.1 itself.297 As for
the standard of review, the type 2 collusion dismissal is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.298
CONCLUSION
For the reasons presented above, the circuit courts should review demand
futility dismissals under Rule 23.1 and for abuse of discretion. Rule 23.1 is the
best vehicle for this dismissal because it would enable the courts to tailor
standards and procedures for the demand futility dismissal. None of the other
contenders—Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), or 41(b)—are well suited to handle this
dismissal. With Rule 23.1 as the vehicle of dismissal, the courts would be free
to assign the standard of review that best suits the demand futility dismissal.
The standard of review should be abuse of discretion. This historical standard
prevails under the Supreme Court’s Underwood test, which enumerates several
factors of vital importance for achieving the proper division of labor between
the district and circuit courts. The demand futility dismissal’s deferential
standard of review is further supported by the standards of review that apply to
the other Rule 23.1 dismissals. In maintaining the historical standard, the

295 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.”). In Amar v. Garnier Enterprises, Inc., the court dismissed a derivative
action pursuant to Rule(h)(3) based on collusion. 41 F.R.D. 211, 217–18 (C.D. Cal. 1966). As the Federal
Practice Treatise notes, the Amar court “concluded that the transaction [at issue] was a sham, which justified
dismissal under Section 1359, as well as Rule 23.1.” 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 1830.
296 E.g., Haag v. United States, 736 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2013).
297 See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 61, § 1830 n.1 (citing City of Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 246
(1887)) (noting that, where shareholder neglected to allege non-collusion, the Court dismissed under Equity
Rule 94—“the predecessor to Rule 23.1”).
298 See Kautz v. Sugarman, No. 10 Civ. 3478 (RJS), 2011 WL 1330676, at *3, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2011) (dismissing for failure to allege non-collusion), aff’d, 456 F. App’x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2011) (reviewing for
abuse of discretion).
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courts should reject the arguments for de novo review, both those advanced by
the courts and others presented in this Comment.
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